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a b s t r a c t
We examine the problem of setting optimal incentives for a portfolio manager hired by an investor who
wants to induce ambiguity–robust portfolio choiceswith respect to estimation errors in expected returns.
Adopting a worst-case max–min approach we obtain the optimal compensation in various cases where
the investor and themanager, adopt or relinquish an ambiguity averse attitude.We also provide examples
of applications to real market data.
© 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to provide a model for the study of
a problem of delegated portfolio management when there is un-
certainty on the estimates of the expected returns of the assets in
the investment set and the agents are averse to such an ambiguity.
We are interested in analyzing the effects of ambiguity aver-
sion in portfolio choices and managerial fees. To this end we as-
sume that a portfolio manager with an exponential utility function
is hired by an investor who pays him a fee on the final wealth pro-
duced by the selected portfolio strategy. The manager accepts the
contract under the condition that his compensation is at least as
large as a minimum level that he sets based on his minimum ac-
ceptable level of utility.
This kind of problem is studied within the theory of Delegated
Portfolio Management where the optimal form of a contract be-
tween investors and managers is investigated. The seminal paper
of this theory is due to Bhattacharya and Pfleiderer (1985) [7].
A nice review of the main contributions can be found in Stracca
(2006) [22]. Formore recent references see also Fabretti andHerzel
(2012) [15]. Our approach integrates an important line of research
in robust portfolio selection; see e.g., [2,4,9,10,18,14,13,17,19,23]
and references therein. Instead of assuming a probability distri-
bution and formulating a stochastic optimization problem, Robust
Optimization (RO) confines data uncertainties into an uncertainty
set, and follows a worst-case approach which takes full respon-
sibility for all occurrences of data within the uncertainty set, an
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +90 3122902603.
E-mail addresses: annalisa.fabretti@uniroma2.it (A. Fabretti),
stefano.herzel@uniroma2.it (S. Herzel), mustafap@bilkent.edu.tr (M.Ç. Pınar).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2014.02.002
0167-6377/© 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.approach akin to themin–max approach of robust control. Suitable
uncertainty sets (ellipsoidal, polyhedral) are justified according to
the problem context, and ROmethodology proceeds by transform-
ing themin–max problem into a ‘‘tractable’’ (that can be processed
by available efficient algorithms) optimization problem. In the con-
text of portfolio selection, it is well-known that distribution of
expected returns is not known precisely, and that portfolio com-
position is particularly sensitive to expected return data [5,6,8,12].
Several authors in the references [3,4,9–11,14,13,17,19,21,23] ad-
dressed this problem by applying robust optimization techniques
to variants of the portfolio selection problems.
In general, past contributions on robust portfolio selection,with
the exception of Garlappi et al. (2007) [17], rely on numerical so-
lution of optimization problems, whereas in this paper we obtain a
closed-form robust portfolio selection rule. We consider a one pe-
riod economy with n risky assets following a multivariate return
distribution and a risk-less asset. In this world there is an investor
who is averse to estimation error in the expected return estimates
of the risky assets (we call this ambiguity aversion). The investor,
unable (or unwilling) to undertake the investment directly by her-
self, wants to hire a portfolio manager. She offers a contract which
is a linear function of the final (random)wealth, and faces the prob-
lem of selecting a suitable fee to be paid to the manager (by maxi-
mizing ambiguity robust expected final wealth after paying off the
manager),which should be sufficiently high to attract themanager.
Themanager accepts the contract provided that his utility reserva-
tion constraint is satisfied. The main objective of our study is to
formulate a model that is simple enough to get explicit results but
also sufficiently structured to address important issues such as the
impact of the investor’s ambiguity aversion. This impact ismeasur-
able from the explicit formulae we obtain.
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real market data, determining the sharing rules for different cases
of investment strategieswith a constraint based on socially respon-
sible rules. This example is interesting because we can compare
two opposite effects due to the restriction of the investment set,
the first one negative, because of the ruled out investment oppor-
tunities, the secondonepositive, becausemore socially responsible
firms may be, according to some professionals and academics [1],
more ‘‘transparent’’ and hence more desirable for an ambiguity
averse decision maker. For details, the reader is referred to the ex-
tended version of our paper [16].
2. Portfolio strategies under ambiguity aversion
Here we consider the problem of an Ambiguity Averse (AA)
agentwith a Constant Absolute Risk Averse (CARA) utility with risk
aversion α, e.g. a negative exponential utility function. The agent
maximizes his utility trading in one risk-less asset with return R ≥
1 and in n risky assets with return vector X which follows a Gaus-
sian law with mean X̄ and positive definite variance–covariance
matrix Σ .
We model ambiguity as uncertainty in the mean of the return
vector X. We assume that an AA agent is uncertain about the true
mean X̄, but assumes that it belongs to the set
U (ϵ)
X̂
= {Y ∈ Rn|(Y − X̂)TΣ−1(Y − X̂) ≤ ϵ2}, (1)
that is an n-dimensional ellipsoid centered at X̂ (the estimated
mean) with radius ϵ, which we call the ‘‘level of ambiguity aver-
sion’’. The idea is that the decisions of an AA agent are taken by
considering the worst case occurrences of the true mean X̄ within
the set U (ϵ)
X̂
. Therefore, more conservative choices are taken when
the set is larger, i.e. for greater values of ϵ, while an ‘‘Ambiguity
Neutral’’ agent who does not have any doubt about errors in the
estimated values sets ϵ equal to zero and assumes that the esti-
matedmean X̂ is equal to the truemean X̄. The differences between
the true mean X̄ and its forecast X̂ depend on the variance of the
returns, hence they are scaled by the inverse of the covariancema-
trix. The random variable (X̄ − X̂)TΣ−1(X̄ − X̂) has a well known
distribution (under standard assumptions on the returns), and this
fact, as we will see in Section 5, can be exploited to set the values
for ϵ in order to get the desired likelihood for the true mean to be-
long to the set U (ϵ)
X̂
.
Let us define the vector of estimated excess expected returns
µ̂ = X̂ − R1 where 1 is a n-vector of ones and the quantity
Ĥ =

µ̂TΣ−1µ̂. It is well known that Ĥ is themaximal Sharpe Ra-
tio obtainable in a market model with parameters Σ and µ̂. Note
that it depends on the estimated value of the expected excess re-
turn which may be different from the unknown real value. An AA
investor who believes that the real expected return X̄ belongs to











where ω is the n-dimensional portfolio vector (i.e. ωi represents
the money invested in the ith risky asset). After solving the inner
problem, the optimization becomes
max
ω





= Ĥ − ϵ. (2)
Hence we can define the ‘‘ambiguity averse’’ Sharpe Ratio, with
level of ambiguity aversion ϵ, as Ĥϵ = Ĥ − ϵ. Therefore Ĥϵ is the
maximal Sharpe Ratio according to an AA investor. Note that it isalways smaller than the Sharpe Ratio Ĥ based on the estimated val-
ues and that it may also be negative. A negative Ĥϵ means that the
AA investor will refrain from investing in the risky assets.
Let W0 be the initial wealth to be invested, then the AA agent













where X ∼ N(X̄, Σ). The following proposition shows that (3) has
a closed form solution.
Proposition 1. Let returns X be normally distributed with mean X̄
and variance Σ . An AA agent with a CARA utility with risk-aversion α
and ambiguity set U (ϵ)
X̂
selects the same portfolio strategy as an agent
who is ambiguity neutral but is risk-averse with a coefficient of risk-
aversion α̂ϵ = α ĤĤϵ , provided that Ĥϵ > 0. When Ĥϵ ≤ 0 the AA
agent is equivalent to an agent with an infinite risk-aversion.
Proof. An agent who is neutral with respect to ambiguity assumes
that the true mean X̄ is equal to the estimated mean X̂ and selects





















where the last equality follows from the assumption of neutrality
with respect to ambiguity.









Σ−1µ̂ if Ĥϵ > 0
0 if Ĥϵ ≤ 0.
(6)
Then the result follows immediately from comparing the two
solutions (5) and (6).
To obtain (6) we start by computing the expectation in (3) and














Taking the logarithm and solving the inner minimization problem









Under the hypothesis that the problem admits a solution ω̂ differ-
ent from zero, first-order conditions (note that the objective is a
concave function of ω)





are both necessary and sufficient. Straightforward computations
then lead to (6). 
The previous result states that increasing the level of ambiguity
aversion leads to an increase in the risk aversion. More precisely,
the parameter of risk aversion increases by a factor that is propor-
tional to the ratio between the estimated Sharpe ratio Ĥ and the AA
Sharpe ratio Ĥϵ . When the uncertainty on the estimate is so high
that Ĥϵ is not positive, the agent does not assume any position in
the risky assets and put all hiswealth into the risk-free investment,
i.e. he behaves as if his risk aversion is infinite.
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Now we consider the problem of an investor who wishes to
delegate the management of her wealth to a portfolio manager.
We assume that the investor is risk-neutral, while the portfolio
manager has a CARA utility with risk-aversion α. Both the investor
and the manager may also be averse to ambiguity.
The investor allocates a capitalW0 to theportfoliomanagerwith
the mandate to form a portfolio with the assets available in the
market, including the risk free asset. At the end of the period, the
investor will compensate the manager with a fraction b of the final
value of the portfolio, keeping the rest for herself. Hence an Ambi-
guity Neutral manager with risk aversion coefficient α determines









where X ∼ N(X̂, Σ). We also assume that themanager sets a min-
imum level b0 for the fraction of the final value of the portfolio to
accept the contract and a maximum level that is equal to 1. The
choice of b0 will be discussed in detail in Section 4. Therefore, the
problem of the investor is to choose the best value for the compen-
sation factor b according to her utility, by keeping in mind that the
value of b also affects the portfolio strategy of the manager.
From Proposition 1 it follows that an AA manager is equiva-
lent, in terms of portfolio choices, to anAmbiguityNeutralmanager
with an adjusted risk-aversion. For this reason, we can consider, as
a general case, the problem of an AA investor who hires an Ambi-








(1 − b)(ω̂T (X − R1) + W0R)

(8)
whereX ∼ N(X̄, Σ) and the allocation ω̂ is chosen by themanager





Proposition 2. The optimal compensation factor for an AA investor










if δ > Ĥ (10)
where (·)[b0,1] represents projection onto the interval [b0, 1].
Proof. We consider first theminimum in (8), that is a convex opti-
mization problem satisfying Slater condition, therefore optimality
conditions are both necessary and sufficient. The Lagrangian func-
tion isL(X̄, λ) = ω̂T (X̄−1R)+W0R−λ(δ2−(X̄−X̂)TΣ−1(X̄−X̂)),
and first order conditionswith respect to X̄ admit the solution X̄∗ =
X̂− 12λΣω̂ which gives L(X̄
∗, λ) = ω̂T µ̂+W0R− 14λ ω̂
TΣω̂−λδ2.
Differentiating and solving for λ gives λ∗ =
√
ω̂TΣω̂
2δ , which trans-















. The objective function is convex for Ĥ ≥
δ and concave for Ĥ < δ. Its first derivative is −W0R − Ĥ(Ĥ−δ)α b2




if δ > Ĥ .Proposition 2 shows that if δ ≤ Ĥ , the investor assigns to the
manager theminimum possible share that is sufficient to hire him,
because a smaller share keeps the manager greedy and ready to
assume riskier positions, which is adequate for the risk-neutral in-
vestor. If δ > Ĥ the investor is so pessimistic about the quality of
the mean return estimates that she would rather stay away from
the risky assets. In this case increasing b has, for the investor, both
positive and negative effects. Positive because it induces the man-
ager to be more risk-averse, negative because it decreases the in-
vestor’swealth. The value of b∗ for the case δ > Ĥ finds the balance
between these two effects. The projection onto the interval [b0, 1]
is due to the constraint imposed to the original problem.
We remark that, as shownby Proposition 1,when the ambiguity
aversion δ is greater than Ĥ , the optimal choice for a risk-neutral
(and also for a risk-averse) investor would be to refrain from
investing into risky assets.
The case of an AA portfolio manager is obtained as a corollary of
the previous result. The notation Ĥδ is defined analogously to Ĥϵ .
Corollary 1. The optimal compensation factor for an AA investorwith
ambiguity set U (δ)
X̂
dealing with a CARA utility manager with risk-









if Ĥϵ > 0 and Ĥδ < 0
b0 o.w.
Proof. It is sufficient to use Proposition 1 and substitute α̂ϵ for α
into (10). 
When the manager is strongly diffident about the estimates
(i.e. his AA Sharpe ratio is negative), he will invest all the wealth
in the risk-free asset, independently from the incentives received
by the investor, therefore the best strategy for the investor is to set
the compensation to theminimum level b0 set by the participation
constraint. Indeed, the quantity b0 plays a key role in this problem
and in the next section we will see how it can be determined.
To focus our analysis on the effects of ambiguity aversionwe as-
sumed that the investor is risk-neutral. In the case of a risk averse
investor all formulas become more complicated, but it is still pos-
sible to show that the optimal sharing factor is increasing with the
risk aversion of the investor and decreasing with the risk aversion
of the manager. This is due to the fact that increasing the sharing
factor increases the manager’s risk aversion and therefore the in-
vestor uses it to align the manager’s attitude towards risk with her
own.
4. Setting the participation constraint
We assumed that the AA manager accepts the contract only
if the investor offers a share of the final wealth greater than a
minimum level b0 chosen by themanager. The choice of b0 depends
on aminimum level of utility Ū that themanager expects to receive







T (X−R1)+W0R)] = Ū, (11)
where X ∼ N(X̄, Σ). We know that the optimal strategy selected





Σ−1µ̂, where 1A is the char-
acteristic function of the set A, and that (11) is equivalent to −αb0
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with the required level of utility Ū and decreases with the
Ambiguity Adjusted Sharpe Ratio Ĥϵ . When Ĥϵ is positive, the
portfolio manager is willing to invest in risky assets, and hence he
reduces the sharing factor required to achieve the level of utility Ū .
To determine Ū themanager should compute the utility that he
may obtain from other competing job offers. As a general case we
consider a manager who has the opportunity to work for another
investor who offers the same amount of money W0 to be invested
in a set of assets, we denote by ρ the level of ambiguity aversion
of the manager and by H̄ρ the ambiguity adjusted Sharpe Ratio
on the alternative investment set. Assuming that the alternative
contract provides a sharing factor b̄0, we can easily compute the
utility achieved by the manager on the alternative contract, that is
the reservation utility Ū = −e−αb̄0W0R−
H̄2ρ
2 1H̄ρ>0 . Substituting into
(12) we determine the equation of the sharing factors









The sharing factor b0 increases with the Ambiguity Adjusted slope
of the capital market line in the alternative investment set, and
decreases with the Ambiguity Adjusted slope of the capital market
line in the actual investment set. Therefore there may be cases
where, because of the relative difference in the levels of ambiguity,
themanager iswilling to decrease the level of the sharing factor. An
interesting special case is when the alternative investment set has
the same Sharpe ratio as the proposed one butwithout uncertainty
on the estimates of the expected returns (i.e. H̄ρ = Ĥ). In such
a case the difference between b0 and b̄0 may be interpreted as a
‘‘premium for ambiguity’’, as it represents the extra compensation
required by the manager when two investment sets differ only by
the uncertainty on the expected returns.
5. An application
As an example of application of our results to real market data,
we consider an investment mandate subject to some restrictions
imposedby the investor. In particular,we study investment restric-
tions due to principles related to Social Responsibility (and to its
contrary). We want to analyze how the ambiguity aversions of an
investor and of a portfoliomanager affect their optimal sharing fac-
tor. As a proxy for the choice of a socially responsible investment
strategy we chose the FTSE KLD Social Index (henceforth KLD in-
dex).
We choose the Vice Fund as a proxy for ‘‘non-socially-
responsible’’ investments. The Vice Fund invests in companies
engaged in the aerospace and defense industries, owners and oper-
ators, gaming facilities as well as manufacturers of gaming equip-
ment,manufactures of tobacco products andproducers of alcoholic
beverages.We remark that there is no intersection between the in-
vestment sets considered by the two strategies. The proxy for the
risk free assets is the one-month Treasury bill. We are equipped
with three time series spanning the period from September 2002
to September 2012.
For each month t we computed the sample mean X̂t and vari-
anceΣt of themonthly excess returns of the two indices on amov-
ing window consisting of the previous T = 36months. From these
quantities, applying formula (2), we computed the ex-ante optimal
Sharpe ratios of three investment strategies: the first one, called
the ‘‘conventional’’ strategy, that combines the risk-free asset with
the two indexes, the second one, called the ‘‘green’’ strategy, which
excludes the Vice index and the ‘‘black’’ strategy, which excludes
the KLD index.
Fig. 1 represents the optimal Sharpe ratios of the three strate-
gies. As expected, because of the benefits of diversification, the
Sharpe ratio of the conventional strategy is always above the otherFig. 1. Expected Sharpe ratios for the ‘‘conventional’’, the ‘‘black’’ and the ‘‘green’’
strategies. The straight lines represent the tolerances to ambiguity for n = 2 (the
conventional case) and n = 1 (the other cases) at a probability level p = 0.7. When
the Sharpe ratio is below the corresponding tolerance line, an ambiguity averse
investor should invest only in the risk-free asset.
two. Formost of the period considered, the Sharpe ratio of the black
strategy is higher than that of the green one. The only two sub-
periods when the Sharpe ratio of the green strategy was higher
were between the end of 2008 and the beginning of 2009, and
between March and October 2011. Note also that the only pe-
riodwhere the ‘‘conventional’’ strategy significantly outperformed
both the black and the green strategy is from August 2009 to June
2011.
To address the issue of ambiguity in the estimates of the ex-
pected returns on n assets with a sample of length T , we use a well
known result due to Hotelling (see Johnson and Wichern (1997)
[20], page 212), which states that under standard assumptions on
the time series of the returns,whenΣ is the sample covariancema-
trix, X̄ the exactmean and X̂ the samplemean, the randomvariable
Z =
T (T − n)
(T − 1)n
(X̄ − X̂)TΣ−1(X̄ − X̂) (14)
has an F-distribution with n and T − n degrees of freedom. There-
fore, the level of ambiguity aversion ϵ can be obtained as a quantile
of Z corresponding to a given probability level p of a sample mean
falling inside the ellipsoid. The higher the aversion to ambiguity,
the higher the value of p. In our example, we set p = 70%, obtain-
ing the values ϵ2 = 0.267 for n = 2 and ϵ1 = 0.175 for n = 1.
The two constant lines in Fig. 1 correspond to these values. Note
that the green and the black strategies have the same level of am-
biguity ϵ, because such a quantity only depends on p and n. We re-
mark that the value of ϵ is subjective as it depends on the level p of
confidence of the agent in the statistical estimates (and on the pa-
rameters n and T ). According to some studies (see e.g. [1] and the
references therein), estimates on Socially Responsible stocks are
more trustworthy, because Social Responsibility involves a more
transparent management. An agent who adopts this view may as-
sign lower values to the level of ambiguity aversion of Socially Re-
sponsible stocks. Here we take a neutral point of view setting the
level of ambiguity aversion determined by the distribution of the
random variable Z .
The analysis of Section 3 determines the optimal sharing factor
b as a function of market conditions, risk and ambiguity aversions,
total wealth and the minimum acceptable fee. To study the effects
of the investor’s aversion to ambiguity on the compensation, we
consider a conventional investment strategy with a portfolio man-
ager who is neutral towards ambiguity. To determine a reference
level for the factorαW0 appearing in (10)we assume that theman-
ager would choose a portfolio composed only by the risky assets if
194 A. Fabretti et al. / Operations Research Letters 42 (2014) 190–195Fig. 2. Optimal sharing factor b∗ for two levels of ambiguity aversion. The initial
wealthW0 andmanager’s risk aversion α are assumed to satisfy (15). Theminimum
sharing factor is set to b0 = 1%.
he had to decide where to invest W0 on his own account. This as-
sumption implies that 1T ω̂ = W0, therefore, using formula (5) for
the optimal portfolio ω̂, we get
αW0 = 1TΣ−1µ̂. (15)
We also set the minimum compensation level at b0 = 1%. Fig. 2
shows the optimal factor b for two levels of ambiguity aversion
of the investor, corresponding to confidence levels p = 10% and
p = 70% corresponding, respectively, to δ = 0.078 and δ = 0.267,
obtained as quantiles of the distribution (14). The investor uses
the incentive to increase the risk aversion of the manager when
needed, that is when the Sharpe ratio of the conventional strategy
Ĥ falls below the level δ of ambiguity aversion. For this reason b∗
is increasing with the level of ambiguity aversion. For lower levels
of δ, like those corresponding to the confidence p = 10%, there is
hardly ever any necessity of increasing the fee over the minimum
requested by the manager. When Ĥ is lower than δ, b∗ is above b0
and reaches its maximum for Ĥ equal to δ/2. The times of the oc-
currences of the peaks observed in Fig. 2 correspond to themonths
where Ĥ approaches the level δ/2 (see Fig. 1), while the peaks’
heights depend on the assumption on the term αW0 given by (15).
In Fig. 3we study the effects of the restrictions of the investment
set on managerial compensations, with or without ambiguity,
where we computed the minimal required sharing factor for the
different cases analyzed in Section 4.We consider as the alternative
investment set always the total universe of assets and represent
the differences between b0 and b̄0 in the following cases
1. Case 1. The investment is restricted to the green investment set.
No ambiguity aversion.
2. Case 2. The investment is restricted to the black investment set.
No ambiguity aversion.
3. Case 3. The investment is restricted to the green investment
set. With ambiguity aversion at level ϵ2 = 0.267 for the total
universe and ϵ1 = 0.175 for the restricted set (corresponding
to a confidence level p = 0.70).
4. Case 4. The investment is restricted to the black investment
set. With ambiguity aversion at level ϵ2 = 0.267 for the total
universe and ϵ1 = 0.175 for the restricted set.
Themanager’s risk aversion is assumed to satisfy (15).We compare
cases 1–3 and 2–4 if we want to observe the effect of ambiguity,
while we compare cases 1–2 and 3–4 when we want to observe
the differences between green and black strategy and the effect of
restriction. We note that the premium for cases 1 and 2 are always
greater than or equal to zero, as expected, since they represent the
compensation for the restriction in the investment setwithout am-
biguity. The compensation for restricting to green assets (case 1) is
usually greater, because of the higher expected Sharpe ratio of the
black strategy, documented in Fig. 1. When ambiguity aversion is
taken into account (cases 3 and 4), the premium becomes smaller
and sometimes it gets negative. Negative values mean that anFig. 3. Changes in the minimum fee required for restricting the investment set to
set X , with or without ambiguity aversion. Case 1: X is the green set, no ambiguity
aversion. Case 2: X is the black set, no ambiguity aversion. Case 3: X is the green
set, with ambiguity aversion. Case 4: X is the black set, with ambiguity aversion.
The level of ambiguity aversion is obtained by setting a likelihood p = 70% and the
manager’s risk aversion from (15).
ambiguity averse manager prefers to invest in the restricted set
rather than in the larger one. This happens when the level of am-
biguity aversion is high with respect to the expected Sharpe Ratio.
Hence, a negative value represents a reduction that the manager
is willing to apply on the sharing factor. For a long period starting
in January 2008 and going as far as September 2012, the values are
zeros or negative for both the black and the green strategies, there-
fore an ambiguity averse manager would have not asked for any
extra compensation for restricting the investment set. The cases 1,
3 and 2, 4 involve the same kind of restriction, with orwithout Am-
biguity Aversion. Hence, by comparing 1–3 and 2–4 we can isolate
the effect of manager’s Ambiguity Aversion, observing that it has
the effect of diminishing his requests.
In summary, we observed that the aversion to ambiguity on es-
timated expected returns has a negative effect on the expected
Sharpe Ratio of a strategy and, as shown by Fig. 3, decreases the
compensation required by amanager to restrict the investment set.
For most of the period examined the black strategy had a better
Sharpe ratio, therefore the required compensation for managers
investing in it were generally lower than the one for the green
strategy. However, if a risk-neutral investor believes that expected
returns of green assets are easier to predict because of a more
transparent governance, as claimed by some advocates of Corpo-
rate Social Responsibility (see e.g. [1]), this would affect her own
level of ambiguity aversion and, as shown by Fig. 2, decrease the
compensation factor for the portfolio manager.
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